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FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTITIONER
REVIEW OF FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINIONS IN
CRIMINAL CASES DECIDED JULY 1, 1991 THROUGH
MARCH 31, 1992
CARL HoRN*

This review of significant Fourth Circuit criminal opinions covers the
nine month period ended March 31, 1992. Both published and unpublished
opinions are reviewed; however, because unpublished opinions are not
binding precedent, it is the published authority cited in unpublished slip
opinions which is reviewed and discussed here. Only when recently published
opinions are read in light of foundational propositions and principles
repeatedly cited in unpublished opinions-which represent a majority of the
Fourth Circuit's criminal cases-can it be predicted with any confidence
how the Fourth Circuit will decide a particular issue.
I.

PUBLISHED OPINIONS

A. Drug Cases
1. Drug Conspiracies/Sufficiency of Evidence. Several published opinions during the review period involved claims of insufficiency of the
evidence to support drug conspiracy convictions. In United States v. Brooks,
957 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1951 (1992), the conspiracy convictions were affirmed. Among the key points made en route to affirmance
were the following:
a. Overt Acts. No overt act must be shown by a particular defendant to sustain a drug conspiracy conviction. Mabry, 953 F.2d at
130 (citing United States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1226 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
b. CircumstantialEvidence. "Proof of a conspiracy may of course
be by circumstantial evidence; it need not and normally will not be
by direct evidence." Mabry, 953 F.2d at 130 (quoting United States
v. Giunta, 925 F.2d 758, 764 (4th Cir. 1991)).
c. Slight Evidence. "Once it'
has been shown that a conspiracy
exists, the evidence need only establish a slight connection between
the defendant and the conspiracy to support conviction." Brooks,
957 F.2d at 1147 (citing United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277 n.7
(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982)).
d. No Knowledge/Minor Role. A defendant need not have knowledge of his coconspirators, or of the details of the conspiracy, and
* Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina.
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may be convicted despite having played only a minor role in the
overall conspiracy. Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1147 (citations omitted).
e. Quantity of Drugs. The quantity of drugs found by the district
court to be involved in a drug conspiracy need only be supported
by a preponderance of the evidence, and will be affirmed on appeal
unless found to be "clearly erroneous." Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1148
(citations omitted). (See discussion and cases cited in paragraph
II(A)(1), infra.)
f. Seller of Drugs. A seller of drugs in a drug conspiracy is not a
"minor participant" as defined by Sentencing Guidelines section
3B1.2(b). Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1149 (citations omitted).
g. Transactions with Government Agents. Drug defendants are
responsible for sentencing purposes for quantities of drugs to be
sold to, or purchased from, undercover Government agents. Brooks,
957 F.2d at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
h. Sufficiency of Evidence Generally. As to sufficiency of the
evidence in a drug conspiracy generally, see United States v. Spoone,
741 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162 (1985);
and United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
i. It is appropriate for a defendant to have his sentence enhanced
per Sentencing Guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(1) for the possession of
a firearm by a co-conspirator.Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1148-49 (citations
omitted); United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1991);
United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 1989).
2. More Than Bad Friends. The drug conspiracy conviction did not
survive on appeal, however, in United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232 (4th Cir.
1992), in which the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence showed little more
than "association between two persons, even if one has a fixed intent known
to the other to commit an unlawful act." Id. at 236 (quoting United States
v. Giunta, 925 F.2d 758, 764 (4th Cir. 1991)). In reversing Bell's conviction,
the court concluded that his "most heinous crime [was] choosing the wrong
friends. More than mere association with bad people who are committing
crimes is required for a conspiracy conviction." 954 F.2d at 237.
3. Search and Seizure/Inevitable Discovery. Two drug convictions were
reversed during the review period for reasons related to improper search or
seizure. In United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 1992), the
court held that an illegal, warrantless search of the defendant's motel room
earlier in the evening was not cured either by the defendant's later "consent"
to search (once in handcuffs and told by police officers of bank robbery
evidence they had seen during the unlawful search), or by the "inevitable
discovery" rule. The Thomas opinion includes a lengthy discussion of the
inevitable discovery rule, first recognized in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
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(1984), and adopted by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Whitehorn,
813 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
4. Police-Citizen Encounters Versus "Seizure" of Person. In United
States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held that repeated
requests to search a defendant followed by unequivocal refusals (here, in
an airport drug interdiction context) can constitute a Fourth Amendment
"seizure." The court distinguished "police-citizen encounters" in routine
drug interdiction efforts held not to be seizures in Florida v. Bostick, 111
S. Ct. 2382 (1991) and United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 712 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2895 (1991), emphasizing the familiar
"free to leave" test first articulated in United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Because a seizure had occurred and the necessary
"reasonable suspicion" had not been demonstrated, see United States v
Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cii'.) (discussing when court must make
reasonable suspicion determination), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990), the
conviction in Wilson was reversed. However, en route to reversal the court
pointed with approval to a number of factors supporting "reasonable
suspicion" in routine drug interdiction, emphasizing (1) "drug profiles";
(2) special police training and expertise; (3) bulges in clothing; (4) false
statements; and (5) use of a false name. See further discussion of this topic
in paragraph II(C)(5), infra.
5. Bogus Drugs. In United States v. Fletcher, 945 F.2d 725 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1230 (1991), the court upheld a conviction for
attempted distribution of the narcotic drug PCP, even though what was
actually distributed was not a narcotic drug, citing United States v. Pennell,
737 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985).
6. Rule 404(b) Evidence. United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444 (4th Cir.
1991), has a detailed discussion of the use of Rule 404(b) evidence in drug
cases.
7. "Drug Equivalent" of Seized Cash. In United States v. Hicks, 948
F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1991), the court rejected the defendant's due process
argument and held that the "drug equivalent" of cash seized from the
defendant's home (in this case $295,000) could be added to the amount of
drugs involved under the "relevant conduct" provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines, citing sections 1B1.3(a)(2), 2D1l.1, and 2D1.4, and the commentary thereunder.
8. Intent to Distribute/Residue Only. In United States v. Jones, 945
F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1991), the court reversed a section 924(c) conviction
where only a residue of cocaine was found (along with various drug
paraphernalia) at the time of a search of defendant's home.
9. Multiple section 924(c) Convictions/Sentencing. In United States v.
Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held that convictions for
two section 924(c) violations, occurring on different dates but charged in a
single Bill of Indictment, should be treated as first and second offenses
under the statute. The practical effect of that, of course, is to make the
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punishment five years for the first offense and twenty consecutive years for
the second.
10. PossessingMarijuana Plants. A significant change in the law came
in United States v. Hash, 956 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1992), which struck down
Sentencing Guidelines section 2Dl.1(c)n (as applied to a defendant charged
with possessing less than 50 marijuana plants). The court held that the
Sentencing Guidelines were inconsistent with the applicable statute, 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), thus joining the Eighth Circuit in requiring that the
actual weight of the marijuana plants be used in sentencing, rather than
the greater projected weight (once the marijuana plants grow to maturity).
11. Career Offenders/Misdemeanors as "Felonies." In United States v.
Pinckney, 938 F.2d 519 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held again that state
misdemeanor convictions (here possession of less than two ounces of marijuana and two grams of cocaine oil two different occasions) qualify as
prior "felonies" for the purpose of determining whether a defendant is a
"career offender." However, the court remanded for resentencing to allow
the court to decide whether it wished to depart downward in accordance
with Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.3. See also United States v. Raynor,
939 F.2d 191, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1991)'.
12. Cooperation Used Against Defendant. In United States v. Malvito,
946 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1991), the court reversed and remanded for
resentencing because the quantity of drugs revealed by the defendant himself
while cooperating with the Government caused the district court to refuse
to sentence at the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range or to depart
downward per the Government's motion. The Fourth Circuit noted that,
"[i]n short, the district court could have denied Malvito the downward
departure for almost any reason, but not for the reason it gave." 946 F.2d
at 1068 (citing United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 65 (1990)).
B.

Sentencing Guidelines Issues

1. Obstruction of Justice. In addition to the Sentencing Guidelines
issues arising in drug cases, a substantial amount of the Fourth Circuit's
caseload pertains to assorted guidelines issues. Perhaps the most significant
opinion published during the review period was United States v. Dunnigan,
944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), petition for reh'g denied by an equally divided
court (Nov. 15, 1991, 6-6 decision). In Dunnigan the Fourth Circuit became
the only federal circuit to disallow an obstruction of justice enhancement
under Sentencing Guidelines section 3C1.1 for the defendant's perjury,
calling such "an intolerable burden upon the defendant's right to testify in
his own behalf." Id. at 185. See also United States v. Craigo, 956 F.2d 65,
68 (4th Cir. 1992); compare, however, those examples of conduct held to
justify an obstruction of justice enhancement, as discussed in paragraph
II(B)(2), infra.
In United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1150 (4th Cir. 1992),
discussed supra paragraph I(A)(i), the court reversed imposition of a twolevel enhancement for "obstruction of justice" (per section 3C1.1) due to
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statements to a third party by the defendant that he would kill a witness
or his family if the witness "rolled over" on him. The court reasoned that
such statements would only support an obstruction of justice enhancement
if made in the presence of the threatened party or "in circumstances in
which there is some likelihood that the co-defendant, witness, or juror will
learn of the threat."
On the other hand, in United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1690 (1992), the court upheld an obstruction
of justice enhancement based upon the defendant having given a false name
to the Magistrate, and in United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 883 (4th
Cir. 1991), held that each of the following conduct independently justify
the two-level enhancement: (1) high speed flight from arrest; (2) throwing
cocaine from the car during the chase; and (3) lying to a Probation Officer
about the amount of attorney's fees paid.
2. Defendant/s Wealth/Upward Departurein Fine. In United States v.
Graham, 946 F.2d 19 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held that the defendant's
wealth was not a sufficient factor to justify an upward departure in the
amount of the defendant's fine. The court's opinion in Graham contains a
rather lengthy discussion of upward departures generally, before also holding
that the district court's refusal to downward depart is not reviewable on
appeal, citing United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 65 (1990). For the required findings to support a Sentencing
Guidelines fine generally, see United States v. Harvey, 885 F.2d 181 (4th
Cir. 1989).
3. Career Offenders. Several published opinions during the review period dealt with issues related to the "career offender" enhancement per
section 4B1.1. In United States v. Sanders, 954 F.2d 227, 231-32 (4th Cir.
1992), the court held that prior convictions for two separate violent crimes
(armed robbery and murder) made the defendant a career offender, rejecting
the defendant's argument that the convictions should be merged because
both had a single cause, that is, the defendant's drug addiction when the
crimes were committed.
In United States v. Wilson, 951 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1991), the court
held that "pickpocketing" was a "violent crime" for career offender
purposes as defined in section 4B1.2 and, by reference, in 18 U.S.C. § 16.
In so holding, the court adopted a so-called "categorical approach" in
determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a violent crime. Under
the categorical approach the elements of the offense of conviction are the
crucial factor rather than the facts of a particular case.
Applying this categorical approach to prior convictions just weeks later
in United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held
that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was not a "crime of
violence" for career offender purposes.
4. Aggravated Assault With Weapon. In United States v. Williams, 954
F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed and remanded for resentencing
the district court's refusal to impose a four-level upward adjustment, per
section 2A2.2(b)(2)(B), for use of a dangerous weapon in an aggravated
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assault. The district court based its refusal to enhance on the erroneous
assumption that further increasing the offense level for aggravated assault
(for the use of a gun) constituted impermissible "double counting." To the
contrary, reasoned the Fourth Circuit, if the Sentencing Guidelines had not
anticipated double counting in aggravated assaults with a gun, the further
firearm enhancement would have been specifically excluded.
5. Counterfeit Enhancements. In United States v. Payne, 952 F.2d 827
(4th Cir. 1991), the court reversed a two-level enhancement for "more than
minimal planning" under section 2F1l.1(b)(1) in a counterfeit prosecution,
holding that the reference to the fraud table in section 2F1l.1 which governs
counterfeit cases applies only to the table itself and not to the specific
offense characteristics in section 2F1l.1(a) and following. In fact, between
the filing of the appeal in Payne and the date of decision, the Sentencing
Guidelines were amended to so indicate.
C. Miscellaneous
1. Check Kiting. In United States v. Celesia, 945 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.
1991), the court held that "check kiting" constituted bank fraud in violation
of Title 18, U.S. Code, section 1344. Requisite fraudulent intent may be
determined, according to the court, by circumstantial evidence as well as
from "inferences deduced from facts and situations." Id. at 759.
2. Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon. In United States v.
McBryde, 938 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1991), the court reversed a conviction for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) because the defendant's civil rights had been previously restored
under North Carolina law, citing United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216,
218 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 203 (1990); and United States v.
Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 1990). The court pointed out in
McBryde that the federal law was amended in 1986 and thereafter, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), federal law has deferred to the state in which a
defendant was convicted to determine whether his civil right to possess
firearms has been restored.
In United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
reversed a felon in possession of a firearm conviction due to insufficient
evidence of constructive possession. The facts essentially were that a police
officer observed the defendant's shoulder dip as he approached the vehicle
in which the defendant was a front seat passenger. When the vehicle was
stopped, the firearm was found under the defendant's seat. After carefully
reviewing the law of constructive possession, the court reversed, explaining
its holding thus: "we emphasize that the facts of this case fall outside, but
just barely, the realm of the quantum of evidence necessary to support a
finding of constructive possession." Id at 108. The Blue opinion also states
what is not expressly provided in the Armed Career Criminal Act [18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)], that is, that the unstated statutory maximum is life imprisonment.
957 F.2d at 107.
3. Double Jeopardy/RICO and CCE Prosecution. In United States v.
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Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992),
the court held that prosecution on RICO (racketeering) or CCE (Continuing
Criminal Enterprise) charges following trial on related substantive drug
offenses is not double jeopardy, even though the substantive drug offenses
are charged-as predicate acts in the subsequent RICO or CCE prosecution.
4. Voluntariness of Confession/Lost Evidence. In United States v.
Sanders, 954 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1992), discussed supra paragraph I(B)(3),
the court reversed an armed bank robbery conviction, concluding that the
defendant's confession was not sufficiently purged of the taint of an earlier
unlawful arrest and therefore not voluntary. However, the court rejected
the defendant's argument that erasure of the bank surveillance videotape
required dismissal of charges against the defendant, citing Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) for the proposition that, absent bad
faith on the part of the Government, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence is not a denial of due process.
5. Waiver of Counsel. In United States v. Muca, 945 F.2d 88 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 983 (1992), the court held that the Miranda
warnings were sufficient to support waiver of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel by a defendant who was questioned without being told and
without being aware that he had already been indicted. The court rejected
a view to the contrary in a Second Circuit line of cases, electing instead to
follow Riddick v. Edmiston, 894 F.2d 586, 590-91 (3rd Cir. 1990) and
Quadrini v. Clusen, 864 F.2d 577, 585-87 (7th Cir. 1989).
6. Attorney-Client Privilege. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 947 F.2d
1188 (4th Cir. 1991), held that the attorney-client privilege only extends to
communications with an accountant (a) when the accountant is retained by
the attorney; (b) when the accountant is present at a meeting with the client
and the attorney; or (c) when the meeting between the client and the
accountant was immediately prior to a meeting with the attorney and for
the purpose of assisting the attorney in preparation of a defense. Otherwise,
communications with an accountant-whether or not the information is
relevant to a legal defense-are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
7. Withdrawal of Plea. In United States v. Lambey, 949 F.2d 133 (4th
Cir. 1991), the court affirmed a 360-month sentence in a child pornography
case which involved a conspiracy to kidnap, sexually molest, and murder a
child on what is known as a "snuff film." The court upheld the district
court's refusal to allow defendant's withdrawal of the plea when he learned
that the Sentencing Guidelines range was not 78-108 months, as his attorney
had advised him, but 360 months to life. Judge Widener dissented, arguing
that erroneous advice from counsel of this magnitude is a "fair and just
reason" to allow withdrawal of a plea pursuant to Rule 32(d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Judges Niemeyer and Wi.lkins disagreed.
8. Rule 11 Proceedings. United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114 (4th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1703 (1992), contains a lengthy discussion
of Rule 11 proceedings, holding, inter alia, that the low end of the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range is not a "mandatory minimum" about which
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the defendant must be informed during the Rule 11 colloquy. DeFusco also
held: (1) that there is some flexibility in the degree to which the court must
go in explaining to the defendant "the nature of the charges against him";
(2) that the Sentencing Guidelines range need not be known at the time the
Rule 11 inquiry is held and the plea is accepted; and (3) that promises to
the defendant, including the promise of leniency toward his co-defendant/
wife, do not render the plea "involuntary."
9. Joinder and Severance. In United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138,
1145-46 (4th Cir. 1992), discussed supra, the court held that defendants'
pretrial motions for severance had been properly denied, pointing out that
"[d]efendants who have been charged in the same conspiracy indictment
should ordinarily be tried together." Id. at 1145. The court emphasized
that no right to severance arises because the evidence against one or more
defendants is stronger than the evidence against other defendants, which it
observed to be true of most conspiracies. Denial of a motion to sever will
be reversed on appeal only for a "clear abuse of discretion." Opper v.
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954). See also United States v. Haney, 914
F.2d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102,
114 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 102 (4th Cir.
1989); United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1981).
10. Disclosure of Confidential Informant. Two published decisions during the review period addressed when the identity of a confidential informant
must be disclosed.. United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1992);
and United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1991), discussed supra.
Neither opinion required disclosure; however, both include lengthy discussions of the pertinent cases and principles relative to when the duty to
disclose arises.
11. Right to Trial/Multiple Petty Offenses. In United States v. Coppins,
953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held that a defendant charged with
multiple petty offenses with a cumulative exposure in excess of six months
imprisonment has a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, citing Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). Judge Niemeyer dissented from the
majority opinion written by Judge Phillips and joined by Senior United
States District Judge Merhige of the Eastern District of Virginia.
12. Defendant's Absence at Trial. In United States v. Camacho, 955
F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed the defendant's conviction
because the district court proceeded with voir dire, opening statements, and
examination of one of the Government's witnesses in the defendant's
absence. The reason for the defendant's absence was not entirely clear,
although there was a snow storm in process, the defendant lived some
distance away, and he arrived about 50 minutes after the trial began. The
court discussed at length and distinguished those cases in which a defendant
is a fugitive, is voluntarily absent, or has otherwise waived his right to be
present for trial, before concluding that proceeding without the defendant
in this case was reversible error.
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13. Polygraph Evidence. United States v. A&S Council Oil Co., 947
F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991), has a lengthy discussion of the historical inadmissibility of polygraph (a.k.a. "lie detector") results at trial, including
citations to a number of more recent decisions to the contrary in other
circuits now allowing polygraph evidence. Although this panel stopped short
of overruling its long line of cases in this area, there was apparent sympathy
for those circuits which were moving in that direction. The unique factual
twist in this case was that it was the defendant company which sought
admission of polygraph results in cross examining a key Government witness,
claiming its right to do so under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Citing a number of cases from other circuits which had
"loosened their traditional strictures against polygraph evidence in recent
years," the court stopped short of following: "Any such drastic departure
from our previous practice must be made by an en banc court." Id. at
1134. However, the court did, in fact, depart from previous practice,
reversing and remanding for a new trial, and it did so on the basis of
polygraph evidence-holding that the defendant should have been allowed
to cross-examine a government expert (a psychiatrist who had testified that
a Government witness in his opinion was able to distinguish fact from
fancy) as to what extent the expert's awareness of the polygraph results
influenced his expert opinion. It is likely that we will see additional cases
defining the Fourth Circuit's evolving position on the admissibility of
polygraph results in the near future.
14. Co-conspiratorStatements. United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1250
(4th Cir. 1992), contains a lengthy discussion of the law of evidence
governing statements made by co-conspirators during and in furtherance of
a conspiracy per FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E).
15. Statement by Deceased Witness. In United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d
580 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, No. 91-1741, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4612
(1992) (Apr. 10, 1992), the court upheld the admissibility of evidence of a
statement made to government agents by a deceased witness pursuant to a
plea agreement and in the presence of counsel. Shortly thereafter the witness/
defendant committed suicide. The court examined the defendant's hearsay
objections in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Wright, 110
S. Ct. 3139 (1990), and found that the statement bore the necessary "indicia
of reliability" to justify admissibility. See also United States v. Workman,
860 F.2d 140 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
16. Rule 404(b) Evidence. In United States v. Sanders, 951 F.2d 34
(4th Cir. 1991), the court reversed an assault with a dangerous weapon
conviction because it found evidence of prior convictions for assault and
possession of contraband, admitted under FED. R. Evin. 404(b), to be too
prejudicial, but affirmed the defendant's assault conviction. The Sanders
opinion discusses the wide range of admissible Rule 404(b) evidence and
the harmless error doctrine as it applies to Rule 404(b) evidence, before
finding the error reversible in regard to the assault conviction but harmless
in regard to the contraband conviction. The absence of other evidence and
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the length of jury deliberations in regard to the assault charge played a
large part in the ultimate outcome.
17. InaccurateJury Instructions. In United States v. Craigo, 956 F.2d
65 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that technically inaccurate jury instructions
will result in reversal only if there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the
erroneous instruction "prejudice[d] the jury's consideration of the dispositive
issue." Id. at 68.
18. Juvenile Prosecution. In United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1690 (1992), the court remanded
the conviction of a juvenile prosecuted as an adult for certain factual
findings required by 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Assuming the district court decides
on remand that "the interests of justice are served" by prosecution of the
juvenile as an adult, the conviction stands.
19. United States Magistrate Judge/Jury Selection and Verdicts. In
United States v. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992), the Fourth Circuit approved a United States
Magistrate Judge presiding over jury selection, if the defendant consents,
and thereafter at the conclusion of the trial and absent objections by the
defendant, presiding over return of the verdict.
20. Harmless Error/Factof Non-Testifying Co-Defendant Guilty Plea.
In United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held
that it was error to allow into evidence the fact that non-testifying codefendants had pled guilty, albeit harmless error in this particular case. The
Blevins opinion includes a lengthy discussion of the harmless error doctrine
generally, citing many cases.
21. Lengthy Sentences. In United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440 (4th
Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed (June 9, 1992), the court affirmed a 40year sentence for mail fraud and false statement violations imposed by the
Honorable Robert D. Potter, District Judge for the Western District of
North Carolina. The court rejected each of the defendant's objections to
the sentence, to wit: (a) that it was an "illegal sentence" correctable under
Rule 35(a); (b) that the enhancement of a pre-Sentencing Guidelines sentence
for perjury should be disallowed, as the Fourth Circuit held in United States
v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), in regard to Sentencing Guidelines sentences; and (c) that the long sentence is so disproportionate to the
offense as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. In regard to the latter point, see also United States v.
Polk, 905 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 519 (1990); United
States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir. 1990).
22. Armed Career CriminalAct. In United States v. Mason, 954 F.2d
219 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1979 (1992), the court reversed the
district court for refusing to sentence the defendant under the Armed Career
Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which provides for an enhanced sentence
of 15-years mandatory minimum to life. The district court erroneously
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concluded that to justify the Armed Career Criminal 15-year mandatory
minimum, the statute required three separately sentenced, sequential convictions. The Fourth Circuit disagreed stating that all that is required is
convictions for three qualifying felonies "committed on occasions different
from one another." (citing the statute and numerous cases from other
circuits).
23. Waiver of Appeal. And finally, in United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d
182 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit held again that knowing waiver of
appellate rights is valid and will be enforced on appeal. See also United
States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wiggins,
905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299 (4th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 949 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
160 (1992) (Defendant's knowing waiver of appeal held, as a matter of
basic fairness, to also preclude Government from appealing).

II.

SELECTED PRINCIPLES CITED IN UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

As stated on every unpublished Fourth Circuit slip opinion, which
includes the overwhelming majority of opinions rendered, "Unpublished
opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See I.O.P. 36.5 and
36.6."
However, many principles of law are cited in unpublished opinions,
citing prior published opinions which collectively indicate what precedents
the Fourth Circuit considers significant on a whole array of issues.
The following are selected propositions and principles of law cited in
the court's unpublished opinions since July 1, 1991, chosen with an eye
toward practical usefulness.
A.

Drug Cases

1. Quantity of Drugs. Because the quantity of drugs for which a
particular defendant is responsible is the key factor in determining the
sentencing range, it is not surprising that this is one of the most frequently
litigated issues on appeal in drug cases. Key principles of law to keep in
mind are:
a. The quantity of drugs used to compute the base offense level
must only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444,
450 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Engleman, 916 F.2d 182, 184
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1444 (4th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 85 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084 (1990); United States v. Vinson, 886
F.2d 740, 741-42 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 8 (1990).
This quantity includes up to the total amount of drugs distributed
in a conspiracy, if the defendant could reasonably foresee the
distribution of future amounts, United States v. Willard, 909 F.2d
780 (4th Cir. 1990), or "knew or reasonably should have known
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what the past quantities were." United States v. Miranda-Ortiz,926
F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 347 (1991).
b. Under the "relevant conduct" provisions of the Sentencing
Guidelines section 1BI.3(a)(2), all quantities of drugs that were part
of the same course of conduct or part of the same common scheme
or plan are included. This may include uncharged drug transactions
as well as those described in the Bill of Indictment. United States
v. Cusack, 901 F.2d 29, 32-33 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 805-06, reh'g denied, No. 88-5213, 1989
U.S. App. LEXIS 13911 (4th Cir. 1989).
c. When the quantity of drugs seized does not reflect the scale
of the offense, the district court may estimate the total quantity
involved. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines
Manual, section 2D1.4, Comment n.2 (Nov. 1990).
d. Where the quantity of drugs noted in the Presentence Report
is challenged, the defendant has an affirmative duty to show that
the information is inaccurate or unreliable. United States v. Terry,
916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990).
e. In determining the quantity of drugs, the district court may
consider "the drug equivalent of cash seized," if it concludes that
the cash came from the sale of drugs. United States v. Hicks, 948
F.2d 877, 882 (4th Cir. 1991).
f. In a conspiracy, under the general rule established by the
Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946),
"a conspirator may be convicted of substantive offenses committed
by co-conspirators in the course of and in furtherance of the
conspiracy ... ." United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 111
(4th Cir. 1990). In order for the Pinkerton Rule imposing liability
for the substantive crimes of other co-conspirators to apply, it must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the substantive
offense was committed by one of the members of the conspiracy,
(2) while the one committing the crime was a member of the
conspiracy, (3) in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) that the
substantive crime was a reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy. Id.
g. The district court's findings regarding the quantity of drugs
are factual in nature and will only be overturned on appeal if found
to be "clearly erroneous." United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 39,
46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 348 (1991); United States v.
Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1444 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wilson,
896 F.2d 856, 858 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vinson, 886
F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990);
United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
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493 U.S. 1084 (1990); United States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 806
(4th Cir. 1989).
2. Possession. Possession of drugs may be sole or joint, actual or
constructive. Constructive possession exists when the person "exercises, or
has the power to exercise, dominion and control" over the drugs. United
States v. Zandi, 769 F.2d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1077 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925
(1980). For a recent case discussing and finding constructive possession of
a gun, see United States v. Jones, 945 F.2d 747, 749-50 (4th Cir. 1991).
3. Intent to Distribute. The intent to distribute drugs may be inferred
from a number of factors, including but not limited to the quantity, the
packaging, how and where the drugs are hidden, and the amount of cash
seized. United States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 730 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2019 (1991); United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 99
(4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Wooten, 688 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1982).
4. Sufficiency of section 924(c) Evidence. The "use" of a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) is committed even if the firearm is only constructively possessed "for
protection and to facilitate the likelihood of success," whether or not it is
ever actually held, brandished, or otherwise used. United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872, 876 (4th Cir. 1988), quoted in United States v. Paz,
927 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 1991). Moreover, even if the defendant is
acquitted of the 924(c) charge, his base offense level may be increased by
two levels under section 2D1. I(b) if the court determines by a preponderance
of the evidence that a firearm was present during any of the subject drug
trafficking. United States v. Johnson, 943 F.2d 383, 386 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 667 (1991); United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243, 246
(4th Cir. 1991); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 1989).
Finally, the district court's determination in this regard will only be overturned on appeal if found to be "clearly erroneous." United States v.
Apple, 915 F.2d 899, 914 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Sentencing Guidelines Issues
1. Acceptance of Responsibility. To receive a two-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to section 3El.1 a defendant must
accept responsibility for all his criminal activity. United States v. Gordon,
895 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990). The district
court's determination regarding acceptance of responsibility is deemed a
factual one and is thus reviewable on appeal under a "clearly erroneous"
standard. United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645, 646 (4th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Cusack, 901 F.2d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. White, 875 F.2d
427, 431 (4th Cir. 1989).
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2. Obstruction of Justice. The following are examples of conduct which
justify a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice: (a) throwing
drugs out of a car during a police chase, United States v. Galvan-Garcia,
872 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 857 (1989); (b) hiding a
stolen credit card in a police car, United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861 (1989); and (c) hiding stolen mail
under a car when being approached by authorities, United States v. Cain,
881 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1989).
3. Downward Departures. In spite of oft repeated and clear law that
the district court's refusal to downward depart from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range is not appealable, this issue continues to be
frequently raised on appeal. For those who may yet have lingering doubts
about the status of the law on this issue, see United States v. Metinger,
901 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 519 (1990) and United States
v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 65 (1990).
The only exception to this well established rule arises when the district court
erroneously believes it lacks the discretion to downward depart. United
States v. Wilson, 896 F.2d 856, 859 (4th Cir. 1990). Nor will sentences
within the applicable range be reviewed on appeal because they are "too
high" or because they are "unfair" relative to the sentences of co-defendants. See United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 1990)
(denying appellate review where sentence set within guideline range); United
States v. Foutz, 865 F.2d 617, 621 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a]
sentencing court simply 'is not obligated to consider the sentences of codefendants."') (quoting United States v. Lauga, 762 F.2d 1288, 1291 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 860 (1985)).
None of the following justifies a downward departure: (a) a good
employment record, Sentencing Guidelines section 5H1.5; (b) family responsibility, Sentencing Guidelines section 5H1.6; (c) personal financial
difficulty, "under even extraordinary circumstances," United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 919 n.2 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Sentencing Guidelines
section 5K2.12); (d) significant charitable contributions, United States v.
McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 1990); or (e) to allow the defendant
to make restitution to victims, United States v. Bolden, 889 F.2d 1336 (4th
Cir. 1989).
4. Role in Offense. Another frequently appealed Sentencing Guidelines
issue is whether a particular defendant should have received an enhancement
per section 3B1.1 for his or her role in the offense (e.g., as a leader,
organizer, manager, or supervisor). Although role in the offense findings
are appealable, since the determination is factual in nature and the district
court will be overturned only if "clearly erroneous," such issues are seldom
successfully raised on appeal. See United States v. Fells, 920 F.2d 1179 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2831 (1991) (upholding district court's
enhancement for unidentified participants); United States v. Sheffer, 896
F.2d 842 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 112 (1990) (upholding district
court's enhancement for leadership role played by defendant).
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5. Abuse of Position of Trust. Two appeals during the review period
challenged the enhancement received per section 3B1.3 for abusing a position
of trust, one involving a union official and the other a store detective. As
in issues pertaining to role in the offense and acceptance of responsibility,
the determination whether a defendant has abused a position of trust are
deemed to be factual in nature and will be overturned on appeal only if
"clearly erroneous." United States v. Helton, 953 F.2d 867 (4th Cir.. 1992);
United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1989).
6. Criminal History/Career Offender. Convictions for offenses committed after the subject offense are counted in a defendant's criminal history.
Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.2; United States v. Hoy, 932 F.2d 1343
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walker, 912 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1004 (1991); United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d
1161, 1165-66 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 900 F.2d 1442 (10th
Cir. 1990). However, to count toward career offender status, the instant
offense must have been committed after conviction for the two prior
predicate offenses. Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.2(3). United States v.
Bassil, 932 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1991).
7. Burglary as Violent Crime. For career offender purposes, conviction
for unlawful entry into a dwelling is considered to be the "violent crime"
of "burglary" described in section 4Bl.1, whether the state crime is referred
to as burglary, housebreaking, breaking and entering, or by some other
label. United States v. Wilson, 951 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 2294 (1992); United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.
1991). United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922, 923 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Davis, 881 F.2d 973, 976 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1026 (1990); United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989).
Closely related is whether a conviction for unlawful entry of a dwelling
constitutes "burglary" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), 15-year mandatory minimum, per the Armed Career Criminal Act, for possession of a firearm after
three convictions for serious drug offenses and/or crimes of violence. As
the Supreme Court held in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990),
the label does not matter; only if the subject statute prohibits something in
addition to unlawful entry of a dwelling is there further inquiry into the
particular facts, and then only to determine whether it was, in fact, unlawful
entry of a dwelling which was charged and convicted.
8. Government Failure to Make section 5KJ.1 Motion. Where the
Government agrees in a Plea Agreement to move for a downward departure
if the defendant provides "substantial assistance," and at sentencing the
Government refuses to so move, the defendant must be given an opportunity
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Government has
breached the Plea Agreement. United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 420 (1991). Cf. United States v. Raynor, 939
F.2d 191, 195 (1991), in which the court refused to extend this right to
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cases in which no such provision appears in the Plea Agreement.
9. "Straddle Crimes." Conspiracies or other continuing offenses which
began before November 1, 1987 (the date the Sentencing Guidelines went
into effect) and continued beyond November 1, 1987, so-called "straddle
crimes," are subject to the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Sheffer,
896 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 432 (1990).
C.

Search and Seizure

1. ProbableCause. In appellate review of a Magistrate's probable cause
determination, "great deference" is to be shown to the Magistrate's assessment of the facts presented to him in support of a search warrant. United
States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990).
Probable cause to arrest exists if the totality of the circumstances would
cause a reasonable person to believe a crime has been committed, Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), taking
into account information received from informants. United States v. Porter,
738 F.2d 622, 625-26 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984);
United States v. Shepherd, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 938 (1984).
2. Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant. The reliability of an informant's information used in an affidavit in support of a search warrant may
be inferred from the factual circumstances, even if the affidavit is otherwise
devoid of any stated reasons why the informant is believed to be reliable.
United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
111 (1991). Likewise, the fact-based conclusion of experienced law enforcement personnel that evidence is likely to be found at a particular location
may be relied upon in making the probable cause determination. United
States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 259
(1990); United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Foster,
711 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984); see
United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
probable cause where officer told of pistol by informants), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1031 (1989).
3. Description of Items to be Seized. A generic description of items to
be seized pursuant to a search warrant (e.g., "ledgers, papers, books,
records") is sufficient to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. United States v. Peagler, 847 F.2d 756, 757 (11th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365, 1369 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1043 (1988); see United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141, 1144
(4th Cir. 1986) (finding warrant for "address books, diaries," etc., specific).
4. Anticipatory.Search Warrants. Anticipatory search warrants are permissible when contraband "is on a sure course to its destination." United
States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
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Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1005 (1989).
5. Police-Citizen Encounters Versus "Seizure" of Person. A number of
appeals during the review period raised issues related to so-called "policecitizen encounters."
The Fourth Circuit continued to emphasize in these cases that whether
an individual has been "seized" is determined by whether a reasonable
person would have believed that he or she was "free to leave." United
States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131
(1990); United States v. Alpert, 816 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1987). Also of
interest are the foundational Supreme Court decisions being applied in these
more recent Fourth Circuit cases. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). The Fourth Amendment is definitely not violated, the court repeatedly points out, when the
police simply approach a person in a public place and ask that person to
answer some questions. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d
707, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2895 (1991); United
States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322-23 (4th Cir. 1989). Cf. United States v.
Wilson, 953 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction resulting from
police-citizen encounter which developed into unlawful seizure).
Once a person is lawfully stopped, if the officer reasonably fears the
individual may be armed, a frisk for weapons is appropriate. United States
v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The district court's determination whether a seizure occurred is factual
in nature and will be overturned on appeal only if "clearly erroneous."
United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 131 (1990); United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Clark, 891 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Porter, 738 F.2d 622, 625 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984).
6. Investigative Stop/"Reasonable Suspicion." Another recurring issue
during the review period was what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" to
justify a so-called "investigative stop" or brief "investigative detention"
per United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) and Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968). United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); United States
v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Moore, 817
F.2d 1105 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987). The court continued
to point out that the basis for the requisite "reasonable suspicion" is more
than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' Sokolow,
490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27), but less than probable cause.
The existence of "reasonable suspicion" is evaluated under a "totality of
the circumstances" test, and may be based upon anonymous informant tips
if there has been independent corroboration of the veracity of the information provided. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327-28 (1990).
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The standard of review on appeal is twofold. Underlying factual determinations are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. United States
v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Porter, 738
F.2d 622, 625 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984). The
further determination of whether the particular facts constitute "reasonable
suspicion" is reviewed de novo. Cf. United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695,
698 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 111 (1991) (ruling on determination of probable cause).
7. Protective Sweep Searches. Protective sweep searches of buildings
incident to the arrest of persons in or immediately outside a dwelling or
building are permissible to protect the safety of the arresting police officers.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d
1387, 1397 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 59 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990); United
States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Baker,
577 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Weinstein v. United States,
439 U.S. 850 (1978).
8. Consent to Search. Another recurring appellate issue, in general and
during the review period, is whether a defendant's alleged "consent to
search" was knowing and voluntary. The question of voluntariness turns
on the "totality of the circumstances," which the Government must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). Whether a defendant had the
requisite understanding of the English language to knowingly consent to a
search is a question of fact, but whether or not the defendant is Englishspeaking, the Government is not required to show that a defendant knew
he had the right to refuse consent. United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932,
938 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 131 (1990).
On appeal the district court's findings are deemed to be factual in
nature and therefore are not overturned unless "clearly erroneous." United
States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d at 938; United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168,
172 (4th Cir. 1990).
9. Searches Incident to Arrest. Searches incident to arrest are a wellestablished exception to the warrant requirement, United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973). Where officers have probable cause to arrest independent of whatever is found in the search, a search immediately before
arrest also qualifies as a "search incident to arrest." United States v. Miller,
925 F.2d 695, 698-99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111 (1991).
10. Good Faith Exception. A finding by the district court that otherwise
improperly seized evidence is admissible under the good faith exception per
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is reviewed de novo on appeal.
United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Edwards, 798 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1986). Both at the district court and
appellate levels the inquiry is whether good faith reliance on an otherwise
invalid search warrant is objectively reasonable, that is, whether "a reason-
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ably well-trained officer ... [would] have known that the search was illegal
despite the magistrate's authorization." Leon, 468 at 922 n.23.
11. Abandoned Property. Those who are found to have abandoned
property have no standing to challenge its seizure. Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 711 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2895 (1991); United States v. Jackson,
544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976).
12. Vehicle Searches. Vehicles and any containers found in vehicles may
be searched without a warrant when the search is incident to a lawful arrest.
California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 825 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); United
States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988). Vehicles which are in
the lawful custody of law enforcement may also be searched for inventory
purposes without a warrant. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976); United States v. Brown, 787 F.2d 929 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 837 (1986). See United States v. Chavis, 880 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding passage of time between arrest and search does not invalidate the
finding of probable cause for conducting warrantless search).
A third party in sole possession of a vehicle belonging to another has
authority to consent to search of the vehicle. United States v. Dunkley, 911
F.2d 522, 526 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 765 (1991).
D. Miscellaneous
1. Double Jeopardy/Stateand FederalProsecution. Prosecution in federal court for offense conduct for which a defendant has already been
prosecuted in state court is not double jeopardy. See Heath v. Alabama,
474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
2. Conspiracy. Once a defendant is shown to be involved in a conspiracy
he is presumed to continue in the conspiracy until he takes "affirmative
action" to withdraw, that is, until he acts "to defeat or disavow the
purposes of the conspiracy." United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 289 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989).
3. Federal Firearms Violations. As usual, a number of appeals during
the review period involved federal firearms violations, primarily violations
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
section 924(c), use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
or violent crime, and section 924(e), 15-year mandatory minimum, per the
Armed Career Criminal Act, for possession of a firearm after three convictions for serious drug offenses and/or crimes of violence.
a. Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon. In regard to 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), the Fourth Circuit continues to reverse convictions
pursuant to its holding in United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 203 (1990). In that case, the
court held that "a person whose civil rights have been restored
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after serving a sentence (may lawfully possess a firearm again)
unless the state affirmatively restricts the former felon." Id. at 217.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit will reverse unless the Government has
proven a particular defendant has not had his civil rights restored
under state law.
b. Scienter. On the other hand, the argument that a particular
convicted felon did not know he was prohibited from possessing a
firearm has been of no avail. Scienter is not required for convictions
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Ignorance of the law is simply not a
defense under this statute. United States v. Santiesteban, 825 F.2d
779, 782 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318,
320-21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 323 (1991) (no defense
in section 922(g) prosecution that state judge had told defendant he
could possess firearms for hunting purposes).
4. Voluntariness of Confession. Issues related to the voluntariness of
confessions continue to arise with some frequency. The governing principles
of law:
a. Involuntary confessions are inadmissible as violations of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
1246, 1253-54 (1991).
b. An appellate court independently reviews the question of a
confession's voluntariness, but defers to the district court's pertinent
findings of fact unless "clearly erroneous." United States v. Pelton,
835 F.2d 1067, 1072 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010
(1988).
c. The appellate court must determine, under the totality of the
circumstances, whether law enforcement agents have overborne the
defendant's will or left his "capacity for self-determination critically
impaired." Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1071 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). See Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding coercive police activity a necessary
predicate to finding a confession involuntary); 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)
(1988) (providing consideration for trial judge in determining voluntariness of confession).
d. The totality of the circumstances include the defendant's individual characteristics and background, the setting in which the
confession occurred, and the details of any interrogation which
proceeded it. Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1071. A voluntary confession need
not be entirely free of intimidation. Id. at 1072. Nor must inculpatory statements be suppressed merely because a defendant subjectively now believes a confession was "involuntary." United States
v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 403 (4th Cir. 1985).
e. The provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) do not require a district
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and rule on the voluntariness
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of a confession unless a defendant objects to its introduction or
otherwise moves the court for a determination of voluntariness.
United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 173 (4th Cir. 1990).
f. To be admissible, the confessions of non-testifying co-defendants
must be redacted and otherwise comply with the requirements of
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
g. In applying the limited "public safety exception" to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) carved out by the Supreme Court in
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the court approved preMiranda questioning at the scene of an arrest regarding weapons,
drug use, or other matters specifically connected to the safety of
officers or nearby members of the public.
h. If there is a Miranda violation, a further inquiry must be made
into whether the error is reversible or harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 542-43 (9th Cir.
1983); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 361 (4th Cir. 1980).
5. Withdrawal of Plea. Motions to withdraw guilty pleas after the Rule
11 proceedings generally fall on deaf appellate ears. See United States v.
Lambey, 949 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming trial court's denial of
defendant's request to withdraw his guity plea based on misunderstanding
of applicable Sentencing Guideline range); United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d
245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming rejection of defendant's attempt to
withdraw guilty plea because defendant did not carry burden of showing
plea was not knowing or voluntary); United States v. Pitino, 887 F.2d 42,
46 (4th Cir. 1989) (denying withdrawal of guilty plea because defendant
failed to show pleas was not knowing or voluntary); United States v.
DeFreitas, 865 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1989) (denying motion to withdraw guilty
plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel at time plea entered); United
States v. Haley, 784 F.2d 1218 (4th Cir. 1986) (denying motion to change
guilty plea because defendant failed to show any fair and just reason why
guilty plea was invalid). Reviewing under an "abuse of discretion" standard,
Pitino, 887 F.2d at 46, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized the following
factors to be considered in determining whether a "fair and just reason"
exists to warrant post Rule 11 withdrawal of a plea: (1) whether the
defendant provided credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or
voluntary; (2) whether the defendant credibly asserted his legal innocence;
(3) whether there was a delay between entering the plea and moving for
withdrawal; (4) whether the defendant had close assistance of counsel; (5)
whether withdrawal will prejudice the government; and (6) whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. Moore,
931 F.2d at 248; FED. R. CR. P. 32(d).
6. Rule 11 Proceedings.The precise manner in which Rule 11 proceedings are conducted is left to the sound discretion of the district court.
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United States v. Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d 1216, 1221 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 850 (1986). Appellate courts are therefore to accord deference to
the district court's judgment in deciding how best to conduct the mandatory
colloquy with a particular defendant. United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d
114 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1703 (1992). Statements made
by the defendant during Rule 11 proceedings constitute strong evidence of
the voluntariness of the plea, DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119, and findings by a
trial court accepting a plea "constitute a formidable barrier" to its subsequent attack. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
7. Motions to Continue. Whether to grant a motion to continue is left
to the broad discretion of the district court. United States v. Kosko, 870
F.2d 162 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989); United States v.
Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the district court's denial
of a continuance will only be reversed for abuse of discretion, that is, when
the denial is "so arbitrary and so fundamentally unfair as to invoke the
Constitution." Shirley v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 819, 822 (4th Cir. 1975)
(citing Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)); see also United States
v. Poschwatta, 829 F.2d 1477, 1483 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1064 (1988) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
continuance requested to secure defense witness); United States v. Sellers,
658 F.2d 230, 231 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding district court's denial of
continuance where indictments amended seven days before trial).
8. Rule 404(b) Evidence. Rule 404(b) evidence continues to occasion a
great deal of appellate ink. The principles of law to which the court
repeatedly returns are familiar ones:
a. Rule 404(b) permits evidence of a defendant's prior crimes,
wrongs, or other "bad acts" to prove "motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident," but only if such evidence is (1) relevant to an issue other
than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable. FED. R. Evm. 404(b);
United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1986).
b. The district court is given an exceedingly wide berth in determining which 404(b) evidence should be allowed, and which should
not. Indeed, the district court's discretion will not be disturbed
unless its exercise was "arbitrary or irrational." United States v.
Haney, 914 F.2d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1990); Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1247;
Greenwood, 796 F.2d at 53; United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83,
85-86 (4th Cir. 1980).
c. Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion. Thus,
the reasons which justify 404(b) evidence are not limited to those
listed in the Rule, but as one opinion put it, are almost "infinite"
in number. United States v. Watford, 894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir.
1990); Masters, 622 F.2d at 86.
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d. Even if evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), however, it
may be excluded per Rule 403 if "the risk that the jury will be
excited to irrational behavior is disproportionate to the probative
value of the evidence." United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437,
1444 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938 (1987). See United
States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir. 1985) (upholding
admission of evidence where its probative value outweighed potential
to invoke irrational or emotional behavior by jurors). However,
while a specific finding of probative value outweighing prejudice to
the defendant is desirable and may aid the appellate court, such an
explicit finding is neither required nor necessary. Rawle, 845 F.2d
at 1247. Moreover, any prejudice can be substantially dissipated by
a limiting jury instruction. United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d
214, 219 (4th Cir 1982); Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1248; Masters, 622
F.2d at 87.
e. Post-indictment conduct may also be admissible under Rule
404(b), if it otherwise meets the requirements set forth above. United
States v. Ramey, 791 F.2d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481, 1489 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1214 (1984); Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217-18.
9. In-court Identification of Defendant. Whether in-court identification
of a defendant should be permitted by a witness whose identification has
been allegedly "tainted" by viewing a single photo of the defendant in the
meantime is governed by the "independent basis" test of United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). If no objection is made to the in-court
identification at trial, there is a "plain error" standard of review on appeal.
FED. R. CRAM. P. 52(b); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1985).
Moreover, even if the in-court identification is deemed inadmissible, its
identification may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where
there is otherwise overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Wade,
388 U.S. at 242.
10. Rule 29 Motions. The defendant's Rule 29 motion for acquittal
must be denied if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. In making this calculation, circumstantial as well as
direct evidence is considered, and the government is given the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1151 (4th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 218 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 840 (1986); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468,
473 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Steed, 674 F.2d 284, 286 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829 (1982).
11. Credibility of Witnesses for Jury. The credibility of witnesses is
strictly a matter for the jury. United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60
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(4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1441 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988); United States v. Fisher, 484 F.2d 868, 86970 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924 (1974); United States v.
Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36-37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969).
12. Informing Jury Re Penalties. A defendant is not entitled to have
the jury told about the severity of sentence he faces if convicted; in fact,
the jury is not to be instructed as to penalties. United States v. Meredith,
824 F.2d 1418, 1429 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969 (1987); United
States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Davidson,
367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1966).
13. Inconsistent Jury Verdicts. Jury verdicts need not be consistent to
be upheld. Thus, the conviction of a coconspirator and the acquittal of the
only other coconspirator by the same jury need not be set aside. United
States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding invalid common
law "rule of consistency" in light of United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57
(1984) and Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980))
14. Notice of Appeal. Notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed
within ten days of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). Upon a showing of
"excusable neglect," this time may be extended for an additional thirty
days. Id. The time limits in Rule 4(b) are mandatory and jurisdictionalwhich is to say they are about as etched in stone as anything in federal
law. United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing United
States v. Schuchardt, 685 F.2d 901, 902 (4th Cir. 1982)).
15. Findings in Presentence Report. "Without an affirmative showing
the information is inaccurate, the court is 'free to adopt the findings of the
[presentence report] without more specific inquiry or explanation."' United
States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States
v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 346 (5th Cir. 1990)).
16. Lengthy Sentences. In two cases which involved (a) a mandatory
30-year sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for a first-time offender
and (b) a 264-month sentence for a defendant convicted of possessing with
intent to distribute one ounce of "crack" cocaine (but found under the
"related conduct" rules to be involved in a conspiracy which distributed
more than 50 kilograms of cocaine), the court restated its long-time position
that "proportionality review" under the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishment" clause is limited to sentences of death or life without
parole. United States v. Polk, 905 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 519 (1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir. 1990).
17. Restitution/Findingsof Fact. In determining restitution, the trial
court must make "explicit fact findings" regarding "the amount of the loss
sustained by the victim as a result of the offense, the financial needs and
earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such
other factors as the court deems appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (Supp.
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1991); United States v. Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 458-59 (4th Cir. 1987).
Failure to make the required findings of fact may cause the appellate court
to vacate and remand for resentencing.
Restitution by installment payments must be completed by the end of
probation, within five years after the end of a term of imprisonment, or
within five years from the date of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(2) (1988);
Bruchey, 810 F.2d at 460.
18. Probation Revocation. Probation may be revoked when the court
determines that a condition of probation has been violated which warrants
revocation. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 784 (1973). Whether to revoke probation is within the sound
discretion of the court, which need only be "reasonably satisfied" that a
term or condition has been violated. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216,
222 (1932); United States v. Cates, 402 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir. '1968);
United States v. Williams, 378 F.2d 665, 666 (4th Cir. 1967).
19. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel should be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition rather than on
direct appeal unless the record conclusively shows ineffective assistance.
United States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 845 (1986); United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1205 (4th Cir.
1985); United States v. Fisher, 477 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1973).

